The decision by US President Barack Obama to roll back plans for installing a radar in the Czech Republic and deploy interceptor missiles in Poland reflects both the US perspective and Russian concerns on how to build a missile defence (BMD) system in Europe.

That is how Russian President Dmitry Medvedev characterised the latest changes in Washington’s stand on BMD during his meeting with his US counterpart in New York on 24 September.

This decision does not seem to have been an easy one for Barack Obama, especially considering the engagements of the previous Administration with Warsaw and Prague.

Even if it reflects the interests primarily of Washington itself in security, including its political, technological and economic aspects, he could not escape criticism on this issue even inside his country. Unfortunately, such is human nature that the ones who correct mistakes of others run the risk of being defamed by those who made these mistakes.

Just to remind you: a few years ago the Republicans in the White House invented a plan of deploying a powerful radar in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles in Poland under the pretext of deterring Iran’s missile programme. Among the specialists this idea evoked a nervous reaction for several reasons.

Iranian threats?

Firstly, confidential information that the military experts had been exchanging proved that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had in fact no possibility of creating within the next 20 years a ballistic missile capable of striking the territory of the US or any of NATO’s European allies.

Moreover, Teheran had no such plans whatsoever as Iranian engineers were most interested in creating short-range missiles capable of hitting targets in the Middle East.

A striking confirmation of that was the latest series of tests of the Iranian Shahab-3 and Sajil-2 missiles. The White House seems to have finally realised that deploying means of intercepting these missiles in the European Europe is like playing tennis with a baseball bat.

Secondly, Russia, who had every reason to believe that the American BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic is not suitable to confront Iran, raised the obvious question: who against are the Americans setting up these weapons in the immediate proximity to Russian borders?

Awkward explanations provided by Washington and refused admission to Russian military monitors to these BMD sites rendered Kremlin increasingly gloomy. In the end, they compelled Moscow to search for an urgent military and technical response, which was found. In autumn 2008 President Dmitry Medvedev announced Moscow’s readiness to deploy its Iskander short-range missiles in the Kaliningrad Baltic enclave. This statement caused acute agitation among the Czechs and Poles who finally realized that it was no longer a joke and, as it turned out, they had dragged themselves into a big political game turning their territories into real targets.

Washington plans stirred up public opinion in both Eastern European republics. Mass protests began.

Polish President Lech Kachinsky decided to use the Polish unrest dexterously by inflating the prices for deploying American missiles. As an additional price to “compensate moral damage” Warsaw demanded from Pentagon complete modernization of its air defence system. The sum of money the Polish requests contained came up to the ridiculous figure of USD 20 billion.

The wrangle inspired by Kachinsky only made Moscow angrier. Russia knew very well that Iran did not dispose of a single battle airplane that was capable of even reaching Poland.

Thus, the Kremlin had at its disposal another indisputable evidence that paranoiac plans developed by George W. Bush on deploying the third positing area of US BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic were indeed not anti-Iranian but purely anti-Russian. Their aim was to neutralize Russian nuclear missile capabilities.

Thirdly, when the George W. Bush Administration was finalizing its arrangements with Warsaw and Prague, it was either lazy or could not be bothered to share these plans with its NATO allies.

Perhaps, the White House depreciatingly considered that they could just present them with a fait accompli and sooner or later they would be compelled to manifest the famous “Atlantic solidarity”.

Europe’s reaction

Bush got it wrong here too: Western Europeans took such a separate complot as a slap in the face and were determined to demonstrate they have dignity and opinion of their own.

A good opportunity came in handy very soon. NATO’s summit in Bucharest, among other things, had to decide on granting Ukraine and Georgia a Membership Action Plan. Berlin and Paris blocked this decision. As a result, neither Kiev, nor Tbilisi got the precious invitation to this “Atlantic gentlemen’s club”.

In the end, Bush plans on the BMD in the Czech Republic and Poland all but triggered a new arms race, sharply strained relations with Moscow, weakened the Atlantic linkage with the European allies, undermined the authority of pro-American politicians in Warsaw and Prague and dashed hopes for Ukraine and Georgia to become members of the Alliance within the next 50 years.

The only man to gain political bonuses and time in this situation turned out to be Mr. Ahmadinejad and the Islamic extremists he is surrounded by. They must be immensely grateful to George W. Bush and his beloved Condoleezza Rice for derailing the BMD programme.

As for President Barack Obama and Defence Minister Robert Gates, all they did was timely intervening to correct the ghastly mistake the Republicans made in American foreign policy. This error could have made the world more dangerous and put the US and European security to a serious test.

However, it is common practice that the one who should have apologized to the American people and the world community, is now trying to use all its influence to put unprecedented pressure on the White House.

For the sake of justice it is necessary to note that in Russia too the new initiatives put forward by Barack Obama are regarded as evasive. Indeed, on the one hand, one of the irritants in Russia-US strategic relations has been removed, and thus it gives green light to signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

On the other hand, Russia needs guarantees that the mobile BMD assets deployed, for example, on the ships sailing the Mediterranean sea would not turn into new problems for us in the future. A battle ship equipped with interceptor missiles and means of remote surveillance is capable of weighing the anchor and sailing up to Russian coastline.

In the end, instead of missiles charged in Polish mines we would get the same missiles but already sailing around on the deck of an American battle ship in Polish territorial waters. There is small choice in rotten apples.

I would very much like to believe our American colleagues and put out of my head any second thoughts of the true nature of the ballistic missile defence. But as Ronald Reagan would say in such a case: “Trust, but verify”.

If the new Administration is truly poised to have a strategic rapprochement with Russia for the sake of peace in Europe and in the Middle East, it has to be consistent. Such consistency should be ensured by working out a ‘road map’ on the BMD.

Its first stage should include joint work of Russian, American and European specialists on the assessment of missile threats.

At the second phase we should jointly elaborate a set of political, diplomatic and economic measures of influence with regard to those who dare violate the existing non-proliferation regime.

Only at the third stage, when we are fully convinced that all the actions earlier undertaken by us failed, it makes sense to build a collective system of military and technical efforts to create missile defence with the US, Russia and NATO involved. Trust among superpowers is unthinkable without a common cause. This common cause can and should become a joint BMD.

Dmitry Rogozin is Russia’s Permanent Representative to NATO

Source: Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 October 2009